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* I am grateful to Professors Judith 
McKelvey, Ruth Miller and Henry 
Schmidt of Golden Gate College School 
of Law for their patient assistance, and 
to R. Blair Reynolds, Esq., Vice-Presi-
dent and General Counsel of the Cali-
fornia Land Title Association for his 
helpful commentary on the new law. 
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fessor Herma Hill Kay of the Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley and Rich-
ard C. Dinkelspiel, Esq., of the San 
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rector, Governor's Commission on the 
Family, and presently adviser on mar-
riage and divorce law to the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uni-




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Community Property and Famlly Law 
IV. Dissolution of Marriage 
V. Procedure and Evidence 
VI. Child Custody and Support 
VII. Property Rights of the Parties: Division of Property and 
Support 
vm. Application of the Law 
IX. Epilogue 
I. Introduction 
The year 1969 marked the decade's principal accomplish-
ment in family law, the passage of the Family Law Act. The 
last several years have seen a sharply rising discontent with 
our traditional procedures for handling the dissolution of 
marriages, and numerous reform proposals have been ad-
vanced both in this country and abroad.1 The Family Law 
Act brings some of these proposals to fruition; it marks the 
first legislative eradication of marital fault as the governing 
principle of divorce in any American jurisdiction. 
Because the passage of the new law virtually eclipses the 
past year's decisional developments in family law and com-
munity property, this article will attempt to focus on its high-
lights in summary form, not to provide an exhaustive catalogue 
of all its points, but rather to set out its structure and indicate 
some directions of future growth. 
II. Background 
This full-scale revision of California's divorce laws came 
nearly 100 years after their framework was laid down in 1872, 
and had its roots in the work of the Assembly Interim Com-
mittee on Judiciary in 1964. With the help of a Citizen's 
1. For some recent comparison and 
discussion of these proposals, see Stone, 
Moral Judgements and Material Provi-
sion in Divorce, 3 Family L.Q. 371 
(1969); Kay, A Family Court: The 
274 
California Proposal, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 
1205 (1968); Bodenheimer, Reflections 
on the Future of Grounds for Divorce, 
8 J. Family L. 179 (1968). 
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Advisory Committee, the Assembly group surveyed several 
areas pf family law and recommended a number of legislative 
changes.- On May 11, 1966, Governor Edmund G. (Pat) 
Brown convened the Governor's Commission on the Family 
under the Co-Chairmanship of then-Assemblyman Pearce 
YoungS and Richard C. Dinkelspiel of the San Francisco Bar, 
directing it to prepare a complete revision of the law govern-
ing divorce and its consequences, and to develop recommenda-
tions for a family court system for California.4 The Com-
mission's recommendations and proposed drafts were pub-
lished in December, 1966, and were introduced as proposed 
legislation in 1967 and 1968.5 After two years of interim 
study by the legislature and refinement and reworking by the 
State Bar Family Law Committee, the proposals were intro-
duced as Senate Bill 252 in the 1969 legislative session by 
Senator Donald L. Grunsky, chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Judiciary and a member of the Governor's Com-
mISSIon. A proposal differing on a number of substantive 
points was introduced in the Assembly as Assembly Bill 5308 
by Assemblyman James Hayes, chairman of the Assembly 
Committee on Judiciary. 
Each proposal, Senate Bill 252 and Assembly Bill 530, 
passed its house of origin and was then held in committee in 
the other house. The Senate refused to concur in Assembly 
amendments conforming the Senate Bill to the Assembly 
proposal, and consequently the measures were referred to a 
conference committee composed of three members from each 
house.7 The conference committee favored the Assembly 
2. See Assembly Interim Committee 
on Judiciary, Final Report On Domes-
tic Relations (1965; hereafter cited as 
Assembly Interim Report). 
3. Now Judge of the Superior Court, 
Los Angeles County. 
4. Report of the Governor's Com-
mission on the Family 1 (1966) (here-
after cited as Gov. Comm. Report). 
See Kay, supra n.1; Dinkelspiel and 
Gough, A Family Court Act for Con-
temporary California: A Summary of 
CAL LAW 1970 
the Report of the Governor's Commis-
sion on the Family, 42 Cal. St. B.J. 
363 (1967). 
5. 1967: S.B. 826 (Grunsky), A.B. 
1420 (Shoemaker); 1968: S.B. 88 
(Grunsky). 
6. A.B. 530 (1969) was a revised ver-
sion of an earlier bill which Mr. Hayes 
introduced in 1968 as A.B. 487. 
7. Assembly Report on Assembly 
Bill No. 530 and Senate Bill No. 252, 
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version on a number of points and the net result was the 
enactment of a revised version of Senate Bill 252 as Chapter 
1608 of the Statutes of 1969, with Assembly Bill 530 enacted 
in amended form as Chapter 1609, intended as a "trailer 
measure" to clean up loose ends by amending Chapter 1608. 
Both enactments received the signature of the Governor on 
September 4, 1969, and the new Family Law Act is thus an 
amalgam of the two bills. 
III. Marriages-Valid, Voidable and Void 
The provisions of the new Act concerning marriage and 
its solemnization (Sections 4000-4300 of the Civil Code) 
carryover prior law virtually unchanged.8 
In the provisions now governing the judicial determination 
of a void or voidable marriage, some changes have been made 
and their effects are not entirely clear. Prior law provided 
that marriages which were knowingly bigamous or incestuous 
were void ab initio.9 Though they needed no judicial action 
to render them nUll,l° a proceeding by way of declaratory relief 
could be had to establish the fact of nullity, if it were desired. l1 
Section 4400, of the new Act preserves the definition of in-
cestuous marriage and section 4401, makes only minor and 
insubstantial changes in the definition of bigamy. 
However, section 4450 of the Act provides that proceedings 
"based on void or voidable marriage" shall be commenced by 
the filing of a petition for a judgment of nullity. When this 
section is read in parity with section 4500 (3), which provides 
that marriage is dissolved by a judgment of nullity, and sec-
tion 4429, which provides that the effect of such a judgment 
Legislature-1969 Regular Session, Au-
gust 8, 1969, at page 2. Most of the 
testimony at the numerous hearings 
held over three years remains unpub-
lished, and the Assembly Report pro-
vides the most succinct legislative his-
tory and best reflection of legislative in-
tent. It is hereafter cited as 1969 As-
sembly Report. 
S. Previously Civ. Code §§ 55-79.09. 
276 
To minimize confusion with prior sec-
tions, citations to the new law are given 
as Family Law Act §-. 
9. Former Civ. Code §§ 59, 61 and 
80. 
10. For a discussion of the prior law, 
see 1 Armstrong, California Family 
Law, pp. 32-41 (1966 Supp.). 
11. Former Civ. Code § 80. 
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is to restore the parties to the status of unmarried persons, 
some doubt is raised as to whether the legislature intended to 
make judicial declaration a sine qua non to the nullity of a 
bigamous or incestuous marriage.12 This interpretation is 
not required by the language, however, and would run counter 
both to prior law and to the legislative statement that no sub-
stantial departure from it was intended in this area,13 as well 
as affronting the plain meaning of sections 4400 and 4401. 
The favored interpretation would thus be that the judicial 
declaration of nullity would not dissolve the marriage, but 
would simply record the ineffectiveness of its attempted forma-
tion. 
Similar confusion exists with respect to the nullification of 
voidable marriages, those in which an impediment exists at 
the time of the ceremony but which are good until annulled. 
The former provisions establishing the bases for the annul-
ment of voidable marriage have been carried over intact in 
section 4425, of the Family Law Act.14 Under prior law, the 
annulment of a voidable marriage "related back" and made 
the marriage a nullity from its inception (save for certain 
specific provisions legitimating children of such marriages).15 
Do sections 4429 and 4500 (3) mean the eradication of the 
doctrine of relation back and the establishment of a new tenet 
that nullification is effected only prospectively, from the date 
of the decree?16 In view of the preceding law and the state-
ment of legislative intent,17 this seems unlikely. 
12. Kay (tape), The New California 
Family Law Act, side 1 (Legal In-
formation Program, Bancroft-Whitney, 
Inc., 1969). One notes that the stand-
ard manuals on legal bibliography are 
devoid of instruction on the art of cit-
ing auditory references (apart from the 
common "interview with ."). 
In this McLuhanesque age, it is 
likely that "See" as an introductory 
signal will have to be supplemented by 
"Hear." Finding no other reference to 
taped materials, I have hereby taken 
the liberty of inventing my own format. 
CAL LAW 1970 
13. 1969 Assembly Report, pp. 7-8. 
14. The prior law was contained in 
former Civ. Code § 82. 
15. Former Civ. Code § 85; see gen-
erally 1 Armstrong. California Family 
Law, pp. 41-84 (1966 Supp). 
16. Kay (tape), The New California 
Family Law Act (Legal Information 
Program, Bancroft-Whitney. Inc. 
1969). 
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I believe that the Family Law Act's preservation of the 
separate treatment of voidable marriages is a regrettable and 
needless archaism; the Act's provisions in this regard depart 
both from the original version of Senate Bill 252 and from 
the recommendations of the Governor's Commission.1s The 
historic differences in consequence between void and voidable 
marriages have their roots in the property concerns of a far-
distant day,t9 and the annulment of a voidable marriage pre-
sents the same essential question as the dissolution of a mar-
riage whose formation is whole: namely, is the defect so 
serious that the marriage has broken down? If its gravity is 
not of that order to the parties and they can live with it, the 
marriage is viable. No public policy compels its dissolution. 
If, on the other hand, the situation cannot be borne by those 
who find themselves in it, then why should not the matter 
be treated like any other dissolution of marriage under the 
new law, by the breakdown-of-marriage standard? To allow 
the differential treatment of voidable marriages on the old 
grounds is, in my judgment, to erode the newly-adopted stand-
ard of breakdown, and to run the risk of letting in the side 
door the corpse of the marital fault standard which we have 
painfully striven to drag out the front. 
In section 4452, the Act gives statutory recognition to a 
concept long-enshrined in California decisional law, the pro-
tection of the putative spouse.lIO The section defines a putative 
spouse as one who enters either a void or voidable marriage 
in good faith (thus giving some support to the argument ad-
vanced above that the new Act does not abolish the doctrine 
of relation back in cases of voidable marriage). Further, it 
provides that all property which would have been community 
property or quasi-community property if the parties had been 
validly married shall be classified as "quasi-marital property," 
and divided according to the rules for the division of com-
munity property between lawfully married spouses.1 An 
18. Gov. Comm. Report, pp. 35-37. ZO. See generally 1 Armstrong, Cali-
19. See Goda, S.l., The Historical fornia Family Law, pp. 862-867, 869-
Evolution of the Concepts of Void and 870 (1966 Supp). 
Voidable Marriages, 71. Family L. 297 1. Family Law Act § 4800. 
(1967). 
278 CAL. L.AW 1970 6
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addition to prior law is found in section 4455, which provides 
for an order of support in favor of a putative spouse. Though 
the section is headed "alimony pendente lite; innocent party," 
the statute provides that either during the pendency of the 
action or upon judgment the court may order support for the 
putative spouse in the same manner as if the parties had 
been lawfully wed, provided that other criteria are met. 2 Thus 
it seems clear that the legislature intended to allow provision 
for support after a declaration of nullity, which had not been 
permitted by previous law.s On this point, it is significant 
to note that section 4516, which deals with temporary alimony 
on dissolution of marriage, omits mention of the phrase "or 
upon judgment" which is found in section 4455. 
IV. Dissolution of Marriage 
The chief contribution of the new Family Law Act, and 
one which the Governor's Commission and virtually all the 
legislators involved in its passage agreed was critical, was 
the elimination of the traditional doctrines of marital fault 
as the determinants not only of divorce and separate main-
tenance, but of the consequences of property division and 
2. These other criteria create their 
own confusion: 1) The parties must 
be "putative spouses" (which surely 
must have been intended to apply only 
to the spouse seeking support-it hard-
ly makes sense to deprive an innocent 
spouse of the right to support because 
her (or his) mate had not acted in good 
faith); 2) the party seeking support must 
be innocent of fraud or wrongdoing in 
entering the marriage; and 3) he or she 
must be free from knowledge of a prior 
marriage or other impediment. The 
last two requirements seem to have 
been carried rather thoughtlessly from 
former Civ. Code § 87. If-as § 4452 
requires-a putative spouse must have 
acted in good faith, isn't the third stand-
ard (and perhaps the second as weB) su-
perfluous? 
3. This comports with the recom-
CAL LAW 1970 
mendations of the Governor's Commis-
sion, Gov. Comm. Report, p. 75. Even 
temporary alimony was previously un-
available when the marriage was void, 
In re Cook, 42 Cal. App. 2d 1, 108 P.2d 
46 (1940). Attorney's fees and costs 
(suit money) could be ordered in an an-
nulment action (i.e., involving a void-
able marriage) pursuant to former Civ. 
Code §§ 87, 137.3 and perhaps in a 
declaration of nullity action (i.e., in-
volving a void marriage) as well. Cf. 
Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal.2d 497, 261 
P.2d 269 (1953) cert. den. 346 U.S. 
938, 98 L.Ed. 426, 74 S.Ct. 378. Fami-
ly Law Act § 4456 clarifies this and ex-
tends to proceedings to declare a void 
union null; whether the marriage is 
void or voidable the applying party 
must meet essentially the same stand-
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support as well.4 To underscore the point, the terms "divorce" 
and "separate maintenance" are done away with; the new law 
substitutes "dissolution of marriage" and "legal separation" 
in their stead. The Governor's Commission and Senate Bill 
252 had proposed a single standard for the dissolution of 
marriages, namely that dissolution be granted when the court 
found that the legitimate objects of the particular marriage 
had been destroyed and there existed no reasonable likelihood 
of reconciliation.5 This language was derived from the land-
mark case of De Burgh v. De Burgh,6 and had the advantage 
of the gloss of that encyclopedic opinion as to what factors 
bore on a determination of irremediable breakdown. 
Different language prevailed in the enactment, though the 
purpose was kept, and section 4506 of the new law provides 
two standards for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, 
(l) incurable insanity and (2) irreconcilable differences 
which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the mar-
riage. Incurable insanity is the Ol1ly ground carried over from 
prior law,7 but two changes have been made. First, the old 
law required that the incurably insane spouse have been con-
fined continuously in an institution for the three-year period 
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint; the new 
provision removes the requirement of specified confinement 
and simply requires that the spouse must have been at the 
time of filing of the petition, and remain, incurably insane.s 
Second, the new law eliminates the requirement of testimony 
by a member of the hospital staff of the institution where the 
insane spouse was confined, and allows proof of insanity by 
any competent medical testimony.9 The reasons for retaining 
the insanity standard are not wholly clear; many have thought 
4. 1969 Assembly Report, p. 5; Gov. 
Comm. Report, pp. 26-32. 
5. Actually, this is not quite an ac-
curate statement. Senate Bill 252 pro-
vided that the court would dissolve the 
marriage unless it found that the legit-
imate objects of matrimony had not 
been destroyed because there was a 
reasonable likelihood that the marriage 
280 
could be saved. (§ 4615, S.B. 252, 
1969). 
6. 39 Cal.2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 
(1952). 
7. Former Civ. Code § 108. 
8. Family Law Act § 4510. 
9. Family Law Act § 4510. 
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that the breakdown-of-marriage standard evidenced by irrec-
oncilable differences is sufficiently broad to subsume the few 
cases brought on this ground in the past.10 The Assembly 
Report is not convincing on the point; it merely observes that 
"one who is incurably insane falls into a wholly different cate-
gory than one who provokes an irreconcilable difference."ll 
This may be true enough, but if we really mean to abolish 
the fault doctrine it is difficult to see its pertinence. 
Section 4507 of the Family Law Act defines the other 
(and chief) basis for dissolution, irreconcilable differences, 
as "those grounds which are determined by the court to be 
substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage and which 
make it appear that the marriage should be dissolved." 
Though somewhat solipsistic, the language makes its ap-
parent that the essential question the court must resolve in a 
dissolution proceeding is whether the marriage has irretriev-
ably broken down, and that breakdown in turn shall be gauged 
by the evidence of irreconcilable differences. 
The same two bases serve for legal separation, but con-
trary to the prior law, under the Act a court cannot decree 
legal separation unless both parties agree thereto, or one party 
has filed a petition for legal separation and the other fails to 
make a general appearance.12 This accords with the view of 
the Governor's Commission that separate maintenance all too 
often promotes illicit relationship and the evasion of support 
obligations.13 The statute provides that even if a decree of 
10. Cf. 1969 Assembly Report p. 5; 
Kay (tape), The New California Fam-
ily Law Act, side 1, (Legal Information 
Program, Bancroft-Whitney, Inc. 
1969). In 1966, the last year for which 
complete data are available, only 33 di-
vorce complaints out of a total of 95,-
538 filed were based on the ground of 
incurable insanity. Bureau of Vital 
Statistics, Calif. Dept. of Public Health, 
Divorce in California-l 966, p. 175, 
table 63. 
11. 1969 Assembly Report p. 5. 
12. Family Law Act § 4508 (b). 
CAL LAW 1970 
13. Gov. Comm. Report p. 33. We 
viewed this as a forthright recognition 
of a current problem, and perhaps some 
even preened a bit at our being progres-
sive thinkers. It is more than a little 
sobering, as one reflects on the signifi-
cant progress made by the enactment of 
the Family Law Act, to read the words 
of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle upon the 
subject, written in 1909: 
[Judicial separation is a product of cas-
uistical hypocrisy] "promoting illegiti-
mate births, and a wretched attempt (0 
compromise between the crying needs of 
281 9
Gough: Community Property
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legal separation is entered, either party may subsequently file 
for, and receive, a judgment of dissolution of marriage.a 
V. Procedure and Evidence 
Concomitant with the abolition of the fault grounds, the 
new law has made substantial changes in the procedure for 
obtaining a judgment of dissolution of marriage or a judgment 
of nullity. The change most immediately apparent is in the 
form of the pleadings: no longer are marital severance cases 
commenced by a traditional adversary complaint styled 
" ... vs. . . . . . .. ." Whether the action is for dissolu-
tion of marriage, legal separation or to establish nullity, it is 
now initiated by a neutral petition captioned "In re the 
marriage of . . . . . .. and....... . ,,15 While the change 
is of minor effect when viewed against the whole scope of 
the need for reform, and while alterations in form by word-
smithery will hardly prevent destructive contests, it is none-
theless significant in setting the tone by which the proceedings 
are to be conducted-more akin to an inquest upon the dead 
marriage, as the Mortimer Commission of the Church of 
England put it,16 than to the traditional adversary trial having 
as its ostensible point of factual focus the question of whether 
husband struck wife exactly twice, leaving marks.17 
As the Bar is by now well aware, the Judicial Council has 
adopted a standard form of petition, in check-the-box form, to 
be used throughout the state in all marital severance cases. 
This document calls for information on relevant vital statis-
tics, the marital property, and the custody of children. It 
neither calls for nor permits the pleading of specific acts 
of misconduct.1s Section 4504 of the Act permits a single 
human life and the objection of the 
theologians. " 
Doyle, Divorce Law Reform, p. 6 
(1909), in P. Nordon, Conan Doyle, 
pp. 68-69 (1967). 
14. Family Law Act § 4508 (b). 
15. Family Law Act § 4503 (petition 
for dissolution of marriage and legal 
282 
separation), § 4450 (petition for judg-
ment of nullity). 
16. Report of Commission Appoint-
ed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
Putting Asunder: A Divorce Law for 
Contemporary Society, p. 67 (1966). 
17. See Virtue, Family Cases in 
Court, pp. 86-91 (1956). 
18. Family Law Act §§ 4506, 4509. 
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responsory pleading, which must be filed and served within 
thirty days of the date when respondent was served with the 
petition and summons;. the demurrer has been removed from 
this phase of California domestic relations practice by court 
rule. l9 The Judicial Council has also established other stand-
ard forms for use in practice under the Act. 20 
As pointed out above, one of the chief goals of the new 
Family Law Act was to reduce the adversary aspects of a 
proceeding which is inherently divisive and too often acri-
monious. Thus the Assembly Report on the new law observes, 
"To eliminate lurid testimony and acrimony, it is essential 
that the pleadings and evidence and discovery proceedings be 
strictly controlled."l 
Unfortunately, it is open to question whether the statutes 
achieve this desirable stringency of control. Section 4509, 
provides that evidence of specific misconduct is improper 
either in pleading or proceedings generally, and section 4520, 
renders inadmissible in any marital severance action any 
evidence collected by "eavesdropping" (the term has a kind 
of quaint flavor in these days of sophisticated "debugging" 
devices and "bugs" which can outwit them). But section 
4509, also provides two exceptions to the rule excluding 
evidence of particular misbehavior: such evidence may be ad-
mitted where child custody is in issue and the Court believes 
19. Judicial Council of California, 
California Rilles of COllrt, Rule 1215. 
The 30-day period for response is ex-
tended from the 10 days allowed under 
previous practice and conforms to the 
new Jurisdiction Act, Code of Civ. 
Proc. §§ 410.10-418.10, effective July 
I, 1970. 
20. The forms are: Petition; Re-
sponse; Summons; Confidential Ques-
tionnaire (for use in counties operating 
conciliation courts); Order to Show 
Cause; Request and Declarations re: 
Default; Interlocutory Judgment of Dis-
solution of Marriage; Final Judgment; 
and Notice of Entry of Judgment. In 
counties where the Confidential Ques-
CAL. L.AW 1970 
tionnaire is required, petitioner may 
complete the Bureau of Vital Statistics 
Divorce Registry Form in lieu of com-
pleting questions 1-29 of the Ques-
tionnaire. Judicial Council of Cali-
fornia, California Rilles of COllrt, Rule 
1224 (1969). A significant omission 
seems to be the lack of a form where-
by a child or third party (e.g. a grand-
parent) could bring an Order to Show 
Cause in re: Contempt for failure to 
provide support; the Order to Show 
Cause adopted pursuant to Rule 1285 
is couched only in terms of Petitioner 
and Respondent. 
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the evidence relevant to the determination of that issue, or 
it may be admitted where it is determined by the Court to 
be necessary to prove the existence of irreconcilable differ-
ences. This latter exception would seem to raise at least 
two questions. 
First, it remains to be seen-as the new law is tested in 
practice-whether the Bar and Bench will cling to accustomed 
ways and deem such specific evidence "necessary" to the proof 
of irreconcilable differences in the majority of cases. 
Second, it remains similarly to be seen precisely how the 
case for irreconcilable differences will be presented, and what 
the witnesses will say. With the elimination of the time-
dishonored requirement of corroboration2 and the introduction 
of this new basis for marital dissolution, what Professor Herma 
Hill Kay has termed "conclusionary testimony"3 would seem 
both inevitable and proper. The existence of differences, and 
especially the irreconcilability of those differences-which is 
really to say the marriage's breakdown vel non--can only be 
assayed by those two spouses on whom they bear. For the 
Court to accept these proffered conclusions of irreconcilable 
differences does not diminish the judicial role; it remains the 
role of the Court to guard against hasty and ill-conceived 
decisions about the breakdown of the marriage and the ir-
rep arability of the parties' breach. But when it really comes 
down to it, only the parties can determine whether their union 
is irremediably broken, and the Court ought to accept as 
the basis for its judgment their conclusions-or the conclusions 
of one of them-seriously reached. That this is the intent 
of the new law is explicitly shown in the Assembly Report.4 
2. The requirement of corroboration 
found in former Civ. Code § 130 has 
been eliminated by Family Law Act § 
4511. 
3. Kay (tape), The New California 
Family Law Act, sides I and 2 (Legal 
Information Program, Bancroft-Whit-
ney, 1969). 
4. 1969 Assembly Report, p. 6: 
". . . absolute refusal on the part of 
one spouse to live with the other, de-
284 
spite a conciliatory attitude on the part 
of the latter, was thought by the great 
majority of legislators and witnesses 
considering the question to be a suffi-
cient reason for dissolution. In that 
situation the court could hardly justify 
a refusal to grant an order of dissolu-
tion since the marriage certainly has 
broken down. Refusal would amount 
to a legal perpetuation of a relation-
ship which has ceased to exist in fact." 
CAL LAW 1970 
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There may be some question as to whether a hearing is 
actually required, or whether in a default proceeding the 
decree of dissolution can be granted on affidavits. The prior 
law provided that evidence of grounds not adduced in vivo 
before the court was to be presented by written questions 
and answers under oath, but with the requirement of corrob-
oration defaults upon affidavit were effectively barred.5 In 
section 4508, the new enactment speaks of a hearing to es-
tablish the existence of irreconcilable differences, but talks 
of proof upon affidavit in section 4511.6 There is no express 
requirement for hearing in the statute; the Rules of Court are 
also silent on the point but provide, in Rule 1249, that if the 
course of the proceeding is not specifically dictated by statute 
or rule, the court may adopt any suitable process or mode 
or proceeding that conforms to the spirit of the law. 
Thus it is possible that proof by affidavit might be upheld 
in default or uncontested matters, though it seems unlikely 
in view of the prior law and practice, and to my mind would 
be unwise; the court's responsibility to assess the irreparability 
of breakdown cannot be fulfilled by reading a formulaic writ-
Family Law Act § 4508 mandates the 
court to continue the proceedings for a 
period of not more than 30 days if it 
finds that there is a reasonable likeli-
hood of reconciliation. At any time 
thereafter, either party may move the 
entry of the decree and the court may 
enter judgment. The legislative his-
tory and obvious intent of the act are 
clear-not to mention the prior law, 
which held refusal to enter a decree 
reversible error once a ground for di-
vorce had been proven and absent 
proof of a defense. Kirkpatrick v. 
Kirkpatrick, 152 Cal. 316, 92 P. 
853 (1907); cf. De Burgh v. De 
Burgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 
(1952). Therefore it would seem clear 
that to refuse a decree where reason-
able possibilities for reconciliation did 
not exist, that is to say where the 30-
day continuance had proven unproduc-
tive of reconciliation, would be to in-
CAL LAW 1970 
vite appellate overruling. See Code of 
Civil Procedure § 1770 et seq. for the 
function of the Court of Conciliation. 
Nevertheless, and probably inevita-
bly, "war stories" of aberrant judicial 
denials are already in circulation. I 
was informed by one more-than-usually 
loquacious counsel that he was stunned 
into a rare silence when the judge an-
nounced, in a pronunciamento from the 
bench, that in his view no differences 
were irreconcilable unless they were 
based on deep ideological rift-"for 
example, where you have a communist 
married to a Catholic." Needless to 
say, his case didn't fit that model and 
a hurried continuance was obtained. 
5. Former Civ. Code § 130. 
6. The section speaks of "proof of 
the grounds alleged," an unfortunate 
inadvertence since it hearkens back to 
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ten statement any more than it can by hearing the usual testi-
moniallitany. On any hearing on a question of fact, the court 
may conduct the proceedings in private if it finds this neces-
sary to protect the "interests of justice and the persons in-
volved."7 
The new Act preserves procedures for temporary orders 
in dissolution and child custody cases, but makes several 
changes. Section 4516, authorizes temporary support but 
adds to former laws a provision that temporary orders operate 
without prejudice to the rights of parties or children with re-
spect to subsequent orders, an attempt to keep the temporary 
order from freezing the base of support for future and perma-
nent orders. It also changes the time from which an order 
of modification or revocation is effective, from the date of 
the order itself to the date of filing of the notice of motion or 
order to show cause. Enforcement procedures are covered 
by section 4540. 
Ex parte protective orders are covered by section 4518, 
which attempts to codify the ex parte motion practice de-
veloped pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527; 
two additions are of significant importance. First, it provides 
that an order of restraint may be directed against all but ordi-
nary and usual expenditures, and if this is done, the respond-
ent spouse must notify the moving spouse of any "proposed 
extraordinary expenditures" and account therefor to the court. 
Second, it provides that an order may be made excluding 
either spouse from the family dwelling or from the dwelling 
of the other, but only upon a showing that physical or emo-
tional harm would otherwise result; under prior law, the court 
could make orders of temporary exclusion but was afforded 
no standard by the empowering statute.9 This lack worked 
7. Family Law Act § 4519; the sec-
tion is roughly cognate with the clos-
ure provisions of the Juvenile Court 
Law found in Welf. & Instits. Code 
§ 676. 
8. Former Civ. Code § 137.2. 
9. Former Civ. Code § 157. Curi-
ously, Family Law Act § 4518 appears 
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to apply only to nullity, legal separa-
tion, and dissolution proceedings, thus 
possibly excluding some actions for 
child support or child custody not con-
nected with dissolution or legal separa-
tion (for example, brought pursuant to 
Family Law Act § 4603). Other sec-
tions speak of "any proceeding under 
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two evils: some courts took the view that a showing of physical 
jeopardy was required and denied restraining orders unless 
there was evidence of antecedent physical violence; on the 
other hand, some courts routinely excluded husbands simply 
as a precaution even where there were no indications that 
physical or psychological harm would flow from his continued 
presence. 
Sections 4512-4515, of the new enactment maintain an 
interlocutory period-now shortened to six months from the 
date of service of summons and petition or appearance of the 
respondent party-and the nunc pro tunc decree procedures 
of the prior law. In my judgment, this preservation of an in~ 
terlocutory period is regrettable, and it ignores the strong 
recommendations both of the Assembly Interim Committee 
on Judiciary in 1965, and of the Governor's Commission on 
the Family.lO A "cooling-off" period placed after the decree 
effectively terminating the marital relationship is hardly an 
apt device to conduce reconciliation, and its retention will 
continue the uncertainty and obstruction of property transfers 
which have accompanied it in the past.1l 
Section 4530 of the new Act, reduces the residence require-
ments for procuring a decree of dissolution to six months in 
the state and three months in the county; like the former law, 
it provides that jurisdiction may be based on the residence of 
either party.12 
Provisions relating to attorney's fees and costs are carried 
over from the old law in sections 4525 and 4526 of the Act, 
this part" (e.g., § 4517, dealing with 
payment of obligations directly to cred-
itors) and there seems no justifiable 
basis for the narrower application of § 
4518. Compare also cognate provi-
sions on temporary exclusion in Family 
Law Act § 5102. 
10. Assembly Interim Report, p. 125; 
Gov. Comm. Report, pp. 23-24. 
11. Assembly Interim Report, p. 125; 
Gov. Comm. Report, pp. 23-24. 
12. Former Civ. Code § 128. The 
prior law (Civ. Code § 128.1) relating 
CAL LAW 1970 
to lack of residential requirements for 
separate maintenance has been carried 
over and applied to actions for legal 
separation in subsection (b) of § 4530, 
which also provides for conversion of a 
decree of legal separation into a decree 
of dissolution upon motion of either 
party after fulfilment of the requisite 
residential time. Section 4531 provides 
for separate domicile, carrying over in-
tact the substance of former Cal. Civ. 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Community Property and Family Law 
without major substantive change.ls One clarification should 
be noted, however: the broad enforcement provisions con-
tained in section 4540 apply to any proceeding under the 
Family Law Act and allow the court to utilize execution, 
attachment, contempt, the appointment of a receiver and such 
other remedies as it may deem necessary in aid of its orders. 
Therefore, they apply to proceedings relating to the enforce-
ment of orders setting attorney's fees, and clarify the impli-
cation of prior law that enforcement of such orders was limited 
to writs of execution. l4 
VI. Child Custody and Support 
The law governing child custody and visitation rights is 
set forth in sections 4600-4603 of the Family Law Act, and 
it is likely that no California statute has consumed more time, 
effort, and discussion in its drafting than section 4600, which 
sets the standards for custody awards. This section maintains 
the controlling criterion of the "best interests of the child" 
found in prior law, both decisional and statutory, when the 
contest as to custody is between parents.15 It also creates a 
system of preferences, which the court "should" (not "shall") 
follow, and whose net effect is largely to continue the three 
different standards of existing law in three different types of 
situations.16 Where the contest is between parents, the "best 
interests of the child" standard governs, as noted, with sub-
section (a) of section 4600 giving an apparently absolute 
preference to maternal custody if the child is of tender years, 
other things being equal.17 The old law's preference for 
13. See former Civ. Code §§ 137.3 
and 137.5. 
14. See former Civ. Code §§ 137.3 
and 137.5. 
15. See former Civ. Code § 138; 
Crater v. Crater, 135 Cal. 633, 67 P. 
1049 (1902). On the standards of child 
custody generally, see 2 Armstrong, 
California Family Law, pp. 960-992, 
esp. 968-973 (1966 Supp.). 
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16. For a similar preferential rank-
ing in connection with the appointment 
of a guardian, see Probate Code § 1407. 
17. For discussion of the phrase 
"other things being equal," see Law-
rence v. Lawrence, 165 Cal. App.2d 
789, 332 P.2d 305 (1958), Munson v. 
Munson, 27 Cal.2d 659, 166 P.2d 268 
(1946). 
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paternal custody if the child were old enough to require occu-
pational nurture and training has been abolished.Is Ap-
parently, maternal preference was made absolute as between 
parents to deter custody litigation by fathers where there was 
little likelihood of success. I9 
When the contest is between a parent and a non-parent, the 
new Act essentially continues-with some change of emphasis 
-the "dominant parental right" doctrine of the old law. 
Under prior decisions, a court could deprive a parent of cus-
tody in favor of a third person only upon a finding that the 
parent was unfit.20 The new law requires a finding that the 
award of custody to the parent would be "detrimental to the 
child." This change reflects an uneasy accommodation be-
tween the wish to avoid the excessively harsh and stigmatiz-
ing requirements of the prior law, and the need to guard 
against a Painter situation in which the court might prefer a 
"stable" non-parent over a parent, without justifiable basis.I 
Precisely how much good will be accomplished by the alter-
ation in wording remains to be seen, but as Professor Kay has 
observed, to the extent that it focuses attention upon the 
quality of the essential parent-child relationship rather than 
upon the vices of the parent, it will be helpfu1. 2 
18. Former Civ. Code § 138. 
19. 1969 Assembly Report, p. 9. 
20. Stewart v. Stewart, 41 Cal.2d 
447, 260 P.2d 44 (1953). On the "dom-
inant parental right" doctrine generally, 
see 2 Armstrong, California Family 
Law, pp. 993-1006 (1966 Supp.). 
1. Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 
1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, (1965); cert. den. 
385 U.S. 949, 17 L.Ed.2d 227, 87 S.Ct. 
317. The Iowa Supreme Court's pref-
erence for the maternal grandparents 
over the father, who had temporarily 
placed his son with them after the 
mother's accidental death and had re-
married, was based on its disapproval 
of the father's "Bohemian" and intel-
lectual mode of life in California; it 
was even rumored, the court noted, that 
CAL LAW 1970 
the father might move to Berkeley! 
This result was later overturned in the 
California Superior Court in Santa 
Cruz County by an order making the 
father guardian of his son's person and 
awarding him custody. Order 22077, 
Super. Ct., Santa Cruz Co., August 
28, 1968. 
2. Kay, "Limits of the Current Re-
form: The California Family Law Act 
and the English Divorce Reform Bill," 
in P. Bohannon (ed.), Divorce and 
After (publication pending, Doubleday 
& Co., 1970). Compare In re A.J., 
274 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 880 
(1969); Nadler v Super. Ct., 255 Cal. 
App.2d 523, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967). 
Family Law Act § 4600 provides that 
allegations of parental custody result-
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When the contest as to custody is between two third per-
sons, subsections (b) and (c) of section 4600, provide in 
essence that the "best interests of the child" standard is the 
determinant, with preference to be given to a person in whose 
home the child has been living in a stable and wholesome 
environment.3 
Ultimately, the controlling standard remains the welfare 
of the child, and even the maternal preference is subject to it. 
Prior law permitted the court to take account of the child's 
wishes regarding custodial placement if the child had suf-
ficient capacity to form an intelligent preference;4 the new 
Family Law Act requires the court to consider the child's 
wishes if it determines that the child has sufficient age and 
capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference. 
Parental visitation rights are secured by section 4601, unless 
it is shown that visitation would be detrimental to the child's 
best interests, and the court is empowered to award in its 
discretion visitation rights to any third person having an in-
terest in the welfare of the child-a startlingly broad provi-
sion.s Section 4603 of the Act provides for an action to vest 
exclusive custody in a parent without the necessity of filing a 
petition for dissolution of the marriage; this addition is with-
out analogue in the prior law. 
Former Civil Code section 138, which enunciated the stand-
ards for custody determination, applied only to actions in-
volving a divorce or separate maintenance. The provisions 
of Family Law Act section 4600 apply to all custody deter-
minations, including those stemming from a petition for dec-
laration of nullity of a void or voidable marriage. 
be pleaded by a statement of that ulti-
mate fact. However, in view of the 
specific exception for child custody mat-
ters in the ban on evidence of partic-
ular acts of misconduct contained in § 
4509, it is doubtful that this safeguard 
has much meaning or that it will work 
significant changes in practical em-
phasis. 
3. For discussion of the importance 
of a stable environment in a custodial 
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contest between parents, see Norton v. 
Norton, 112 Cal. App.2d 358, 245 P.2d 
1108 (1952); Fine v. Denny, 111 Cal. 
App.2d 402, 244 P.2d 983 (1952). 
4. Former Civ. Code § 138. 
S. It is far broader than Civ. Code 
§ 197.5, which allows the court to grant 
visitation rights to a grandparent upon 
the parent's death. Apparently the old 
section remains on the books despite 
the Family Law Act. 
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Finally, the legislative history, as announced in the As-
sembly Report (which purported to speak to the final enacted 
version of the bills), simply does not square with the language 
of the statute.6 It states, inter alia, that "[l]imitation of the 
power . . . to award custody of children to persons other 
than a parent is the primary intent of the provisions in the 
new act. .", and goes on to say that the "best interests 
of the child" standard ". was abolished because it is 
amendable [sic] to the same type of application as occurred 
in the Painter case.m This is not only confusing but flatly 
inaccurate: as shown above, the "best interest" standard is 
expressly retained by subsection (a) of section 4600, to govern 
contests between parents, and it did not apply as the governing 
standard in contests as against a third person. 
The new law sets forth no criteria for modification of prior 
orders of custody, and presumably the "change-of-circum-
stances" rule enshrined in existing law will continue to govern.s 
The Family Law Act reenacts, in sections 4700-4703, the 
substance of the prior law relating to child support without 
major change. Though the Governor's Commission on the 
Family had suggested the repeal of section 196 of the Civil 
Code, because of its unequal allocation of responsibility for 
support between the father and the mother, its recommenda-
tion was not followed and that section remains in force despite 
the new enactment.9 Termination of alimony and of child 
support obligations upon the happening of a specified contin-
gency are treated separately in the new law, rather than con-
jointly as they were under former Civil Code section 139.8.10 
Section 4701 adds to the law a provision allowing the 
court to order wage assignments in child support cases. This 
provision, based on the Governor's Commission recommenda-
6. 1969 Assembly Report, p. 8. 
7. 1969 Assembly Report, p. 8. 
8. Exemplary of the many cases 
establishing that there must be a 
change of circumstances before modi-
fication of a custody decree is war-
ranted, is Olson v. Olson, 95 Cal. App. 
CAL LAW 1970 
594, 272 P.l113 (1928). See generally 
2 Armstrong, California Family Law, 
973 et seq. (1966). 
9. Gov. Comm. Report, p. 51. 
10. Family Law Act § 4700(b) 
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tions, follows closely the provisions of Wisconsin law, where 
the experiment has apparently proven quite successful.ll In 
a similar vein and also following the Governor's Commission 
recommendations, the Act requires, in section 4702, that 
in any case where the custodial parent is receiving welfare 
support, the court shall direct payment of child support to 
a designated county official and shall direct the district attor-
ney to appear in behalf of the welfare recipient in any proceed-
ing to enforce the order.I2 The new statute removes the 5 
percent collection fee allowed by existing law.Is 
VII. Property Rights of the Parties: Division of Property and 
Support 
Of all the provisions of the Family Law Act, section 4800, 
on the division of property, is likely to prove the most cum-
brous in practice and the most productive of vexing litiga-
tion. Under prior law, community property could be divided 
unequally, with the lion's share going to the "innocent" spouse 
if the divorce were granted on the ground of extreme cruelty, 
adultery, or incurable insanity.I4 Since the ground of extreme 
cruelty alone accounted for roughly 96% of all divorce filings, 
punitive allocation was the rule rather than the exception 
(absent a property settlement agreement, and often even with 
one).15 This division based on marital misconduct is antago-
nistic to basic community property theory, and has impelled 
countless spouses to tout about for evidence of their mate's 
misdeeds in order to secure for themselves the greater por-
tion, while at the same time it has moved an equally count-
less number to agree to extortionate and unrealistic demands 
in order to fend oft' that proof. Because of these conditions, 
and having in mind the fact that a mathematically equal divi-
sion is seldom possible and probably less often desirable, both 
the Governor's Commission and the earlier version of the 
11. Gov. Comm. Report, p. 52; 
Wisc. Family Code § 247.265 (1969 
Supp.). 
12. Gov. Comm. Report, p. 53. 
13. Former Civ. Code § 139.5. 
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14. Former Civ. Code § 146(1). 
15. Bureau of Vital Statistics, Calif. 
Dept. of Public Health, Divorce in 
California-1966, p. 175, table 63. 
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Senate Bill called for an equal division except where the court 
should find that economic circumstances made such equal 
division impracticable or unjust, and then permitted unequal 
division upon specific findings delineating the warranting 
economic factors. IS Even the earlier Assembly version of the 
Family Law Act called for essentially equal division unless 
the court found it unreasonable or impracticable, and allowed 
the family residence to be set aside to the wife who won cus-
tody of minor children.17 
These measures were not adopted, however, and in my 
judgment our movement from those points has been retro-
grade rather than progressive. As enacted, the new law 
calls for equal division of the community property and quasi-
community property, with two exceptions. The court may 
award any asset on such conditions as it may deem proper 
to effect a substantially equal allocation/8 and further, it may 
make an award by way of offset from existing property in any 
amount it determines to have been "deliberately misappro-
priated" to the exclusion of the other party's community in-
terest.19 The phrase "deliberately misappropriated" is not 
further defined, and seems unfortunately susceptible to a wide 
stretch of meanings, most based upon attempted proof of 
fault which allows much undercutting of the spirit of the new 
law and may restore the motivation for fixing blame which 
we have sought to remove. 
It will be immediately apparent that the application of this 
section raises far more questions than the section provides 
answers for, and indeed, even the bounds of the questions are 
now only dimly perceived. What is the court to do when the 
only real assets consist of a miniscule equity in a tract home, 
16. Gov. Comm. Report, pp. 44-46, 
111; S.B. 252 § 4900( a), as amended 
3/17/69. 
17. A.B. 530, § 4800, as amended 
4/10/69. 
18. Family Law Act § 4800(1). The 
phrase "if the division of property is 
in issue," found in the introductory 
paragraph to section 4800 and refer-
CAL LAW 1970 
ring to the court's power to make a 
property division after the interlocu-
tory judgment upon proper reservation 
of jurisdiction, is ambiguous and un-
clear. Presumably, it means "to the 
extent that there is property subject 
to the disposition of the court." 
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a battered car worth perhaps one fourth of that amount, and 
a few meagre furnishings on which much yet remains to be 
paid? It is hardly feasible to argue that the court might hold 
open the proceedings for an indefinite time and assign the 
use of the residence to the wife during the minority of the 
children, nor is it any more satisfactory to say that the wife 
be given the home outright and then required to reimburse 
the husband over a period of time for his share. One thou-
sand dollars paid over time is hardly the same thing as one 
thousand dollars paid in hand, and this form of division is 
not equal. In the great majority of cases, it would seem to 
me, forced sale of the residence is likely to be the least de-
sirable alternative in terms of social consequences to the wife 
and minor children. 
I believe that this problem of the family home is one of the 
most pressing difficulties presented by the new enactment. 
Several routes of solution suggest themselves. First, the court 
could make a presently unequal award (e.g. 60%-40%) 
of the equity in order to compensate for the deferred realiza-
tion of the husband's share in a time-reimbursement scheme, 
in effect using a "real present value" basis which would take 
account of the interest factor. Or the court could give the 
equity in the home to the husband in return for a present right 
of occupancy given to the wife until the youngest child reached 
majority and some mandate that he sustain the payments and 
not sell or otherwise transfer his interest in the premises with-
out her consent. Or the wife could be given the right of im-
mediate possession and continued occupancy of the home as 
security for the husband's obligation to pay child support, 
pursuant to the provisions of section 4700 of the Act, if good 
cause for the giving of security were shown. Also, as at least 
one commentator has suggested, the provisions of the new 
law may bring a far greater use of the homestead process, 
since section 4808 (a) provides that a homestead selected 
from community or quasi-community property may be set 
aside either absolutely or for a limited period to either party, 
and section 4808 (b) provides that a separate property home-
294 CAL LAW 1970 
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stead may be set aside to the spouse other than its owner for 
a limited period.20 
Of course, the parties may agree to an unequal division 
of the community in a property settlement agreement, so that 
the equity in the home could be set over to the wife even though 
its value exceeds the aggregate worth of the remaining assets. 
The property settlement agreement would appear to be the 
best answer to the problems presented by the present form of 
the statute, but it has at least two drawbacks: it will make 
dissolution proceedings more costly, and this will probably 
hit hardest against those who are least able to pay for the 
additional lawyering involved in the drafting of the agreement; 
and it obviously will not work where the parties cannot agree. 
(Based on a very limited experience, I believe that it is at least 
as difficult to draft a workable property settlement agreement, 
and often harder to achieve agreement between the parties, 
where the assets are scant than where they are fairly sub-
stantial.) 
Other problems obtrude. For example, what of the case 
where the principal assets are an equity in the home worth 
$20,000 and a new closely held business with a capitalization 
of $40,000, present indebtedness of $80,000, and great pros-
pects for the future? Does the term "community property" 
subsume debts for the purpose of the Act's provisions on prop-
erty division? Presumably so. But how can we justify the 
allocation of an equal share of debt to a wife who still has 
minor children with her, has not worked in some time and 
cannot readily reenter the labor market, and who will be sub-
sisting for at least a time on the alimony and child support 
monies she received from the husband? Is she to be expected 
to make up her share of the debt from those payments? And 
if we say no, and attempt to work some reduction in alimony 
to compensate for not saddling her with the debt, are we doing 
any better? 
It is quite clear that at least some judges view the require-
ment of precisely equal division of community interests as 
20. Kay (tape), The New California formation Program, Bancroft-Whitney, 
Family Law Act, side 4 (Legal In- 1969). 
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virtually an absolute requirement, and an accurate and objec-
tive evaluation of each item of the community property as a 
necessary concomitant of that division.1 Some are of the 
opinion that formal appraisals will be required, and have 
instructed counsel to so advise their clients.2 The reverse 
of the standard Judicial Council Form for Request and Dec-
larations re: Default (Marriage) contains a schedule and 
financial statement calling for the value of each asset and the 
amount of each obligation subject to the court's disposi-
tion.3 
The requirement of formal appraisal will obviously add 
greatly to the cost of many marital dissolution proceedings, 
and it seems most unreasonable for the court to reject a valu-
ation agreed to by the parties in the absence of some indica-
tions of fraud or overreaching, or a wholly inappropriate basis 
of calculation. Similarly, it is stupefying to consider that a 
court might require that each asset and piece of property be 
scheduled and valued; I strongly suspect that the courts of 
California will accept lump evaluations of household furnish-
ings at sums ascribed by the parties, and will not devote them-
selves to an extended calculus of the worth of the bath towels. 
Yet, one cannot discount the possibility that the court might 
require outside appraisal on its own motion where the assets 
are sufficiently complex, and it appears that the practicing 
Bar will have to take account of this contingency. We may 
have substituted for (or rather, added to) the open warring 
of spouses and the occasional skirmishing of psychiatric wit-
nesses what Assemblyman Hayes has termed the disputing 
of two appraisers-a doubtful gain indeed. At the least, the 
statute would be improved by emendation expressly permitting 
a substantially equal division of the property; whether so 
1. See, e.g., the remarks of Judge 
William Mac Faden of the Superior 
Court in Los Angeles County, quoted 
in the news report of a Family Law 
Act Seminar in the Los Angeles Daily 
Journal, October 14, 1969, pp. 1 and 
7. 
2. The same news story (see note 1, 
296 
supra) reports Assemblyman James 
Hayes, author of Assembly Bill 530, 
as agreeing with Judge MacFaden on 
this point. 
3. Form adopted by the Judicial 
Council of California, California Rules 
of Court, Rule 1286, effective January 
1, 1970. 
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amended or not, the provisions of the new law make proper 
tax planning critically important. 
The substantive provisions of existing law relating to com-
munity property and quasi-community property are carried 
over fundamentally intact in Title 8 of the Act, sections 
5100-5138. Also essentially unchanged is the law relating 
to property settlement agreements; as remarked above, the 
equal division requirements of section 4800 do not appear 
to apply to property settlement agreements in the face of sec-
tion 4802, empowering the spouses' concurrence with respect 
to the division of the property of their marriage upon its dis-
solution.4 
There are two other relatively minor changes in the law 
relating to the property rights of husbands and wives. Sec-
tion 5113.5 of the Act, originally added as section 164.8 of 
the Civil Code in the 1969 session, provides that transfers 
made inter vivos to certain revocable trusts shall remain com-
munity property and was presumably added to deal with the 
problems raised by the Katz cases.5 Then, doubtless as a re-
flection on (or of) our Aquarian age, the new Family Law 
Act adds section 5108, which has best been described as a 
"Married Man's Separate Property Act."s Former Civil Code 
section 162, enacted in 1872 and now embodied in section 
5107 of the new law, had long secured the woman's right to 
convey her separate property, but there was no cognate provi-
sion for the male of the species because his power was never 
doubted. Now that it, too, has been secured, has it by that 
process been called into question? As Shakespeare put it, 
the "equality of two domestic powers breed scrupulous fac-
tion!,,7 
4. The new enactment does not 
change the prior statute, former Civ. 
Code § 159. 
5. Katz v. U.S., 382 F.2d 723 (9th 
Cir. 1967) reversing Katz v. U.S., 255 
F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Calif. 1966). See 
Comment, Status of Community Prop-
erty in the Revocable Inter Vivos Trust, 
7 Santa Clara Law 148 (1966). 
CAL LAW 1970 
6. Kay (tape), The New California 
Family Law Act, side 4 (Legal In-
formation Program, Bancroft-Whitney, 
Inc., 1969). 
7. Antony & Cleopatra, Act I, 
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The substantive provisions of the old law relating to alimony 
and the determination of the award have also been transferred 
to the new, in section 4801, with only minor changes.8 The 
new law mandates the court to consider two matters not 
specifically required to be taken into account under prior law, 
( 1) the duration of the marriage and (2) the ability of the 
supported spouse to engage in gainful employment without 
jeopardizing the interests of any children in her custody.9 
Though these criteria were not spelled out in the prior statute, 
they have long been recognized as proper for the court's con-
sideration in fixing the alimony award and it seems unlikely 
that the new enactment will work any substantial change in 
practice, though the new law should provide some curb to 
the occasional aberrational judgment and provide a readier 
hinge for a finding of abused discretion upon appeal. 10 
Though the Family Law Act sections on alimony, like those 
on child custody, are silent as to criteria for modification of 
prior awards, it seems certain that the existing law requiring 
a change of circumstances will apply.l1 The new law does 
change the effective date of modification or revocation from 
the date of the order to the date of filing of the notice of 
motion or order to show cause to modify.12 Section 4801 (a) 
of the Act speaks of modification or revocation "as the court 
may deem just and reasonable," rather than "at the discre-
tion of the court," as prior law had it.13 The change is not 
thought to be significant, and if anything would restrict rather 
than enlarge the court's power. 
8. Former Civ. Code § 139 (Family 
Law Act § 4801(a), (b) and (c»; § 139.8 
(Family Law Act § 4801 (d»; § 139.7 
(Family Law Act § 4801(e». 
9. Family Law Act § 4801(a). 
10. Although the case law has 
recognized these factors as material, 
accuracy would probably demand the 
statement that they have been applied 
protectively more often than not. See, 
e.g., Brawman v. Brawman, 199 Cal. 
298 
App.2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1962); 
Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App.2d 
245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956). 
11. Snyder v. Snyder, 219 Cal. 80, 
25 P.2d 403 (1933). On the modifica-
tion of alimony awards under previous 
law, see 1 Armstrong, California 
Family Law, pp. 371-385. 
12. Family Law Act § 4801(a). 
13. Former Civ. Code § 139. 
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VIII. Application of the Law 
Inevitably, one of the most immediate problems of the 
Family Law Act is the matter of its application. The statute 
provides that its effective date was January 1, 1970, and that 
it would apply: (1) to all proceedings filed on or after that 
date; (2) to all proceedings held after that date in actions 
in which an interlocutory or final decree had not been ren-
dered; and (3) to all proceedings in progress on or commenced 
after that date for the modification or revocation of prior 
orders.l4 Challenges to the constitutionality of these provi-
sions have not been long in coming, but no problems of ret-
roactive divestment of rights in deprivation of due process 
or equal protection appear to be seriously presented.16 
IX. Epilogue 
Taken in sum, California's new Family Law Act is a dis-
tinctly significant step in the quest for a rational system of 
state intervention in the marriage relationship. The decisions 
in Griswold v. Connecticut,16 Loving v. Virginia,17 and in an 
important and controversial California case during the last 
year in the field of abortion, People v. Belous,ls are a reminder 
that the rights to privacy inhering in the commitment of per-
sons to each other, particularly in the bond of matrimony, 
are of a very high order; as the Governor's Commission ex-
pressed it, the family is the essential basis of our society and 
marriage is a commitment in depth and complexity between 
two freely consenting parties.19 The law must intervene only 
upon a compelling ground of interest, and with great care. 
The Family Law Act attempts, not always successfully but 
14. Stats. 1969, Ch. 1608, § 37, as 
amended by Stats. 1969, Ch. 1609, 
§ 29. See also 1969 Assembly Report, 
pp. 10-11. 
15. The press informed us that per-
haps the first attack on the new law 
was made by Mrs. Robert Cummings, 
wife of the actor. San Francisco 
Chronicle, January 20, 1970, p. 5. 
CAL lAW 1970 
16. 381 U.S. 479, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 
85 S.Ct. 1678 (1965). 
17. 388 U.S. 1, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010, 
87 S.Ct. 1817 (1967). 
18. 71 Cal.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 
458 P.2d 194 (1969). 
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certainly more gainfully than the prior law, to balance the 
tension between these individual rights to privacy and the 
constraining interests of the state in enhancing the family 
unit and in seeing that children are minimally harmed by its 
dissolution. 
I believe that much remains to be done, and that the Family 
Law Act is a beginning point rather than a terminus. The 
Governor's Commission recommendations for the creation 
of a family court division in each county's Superior Court, to 
be equipped with a professional staff, would have centralised 
litigation on family matters that are now spread over several 
judicial calendars. The family court division proposal not 
only expanded the geographic coverage of the Courts of Con-
ciliation, but their scope and function as well, since the pro-
fessional staff was empowered under the proposal to under-
take dissolution counseling as well as counseling directed to-
ward reconcilement. 2o (That is to say, counseling of the parties 
when dissolution appeared inevitable but the parties wished 
assistance in reducing their areas of problem or disagreement 
and in adjusting to their new roles in life). These proposals 
were not adopted, but it is to be hoped that attention will 
be given to them in coming legislative sessions. One hopes, 
too, that the provisions regarding the annulment of voidable 
marriages will be coalesced into the process for dissolution 
provided in the Act, that the ineptitude of the interlocutory 
period will be abandoned, and that the standard of property 
division can be brought round to a more adroit expression. 
These are perhaps the most obvious needs. 
20. Gov. Comm. Report, pp. 11-14, 
20-22, 24-25. Perhaps it is appropriate 
here to set at rest a prevalent miscon-
ception: neither the suggestions of 
the Governor's Commission nor the 
provisions of the Senate Bill con-
templated mandatory counseling, as 
has frequently been charged. The 
initial recommendations called only 
for a required initial evaluative inter-
view, so that the parties could be in-
formed of the available resources; this 
was later modified to include only 
300 
families with children under 18. All 
counseling was to be voluntarily under-
taken, and the 1969 Assembly Report's 
conclusion (at page 3) that the report 
of the counselor would be determina-
tive on the question of dissolution flies 
directly in the face of the language of 
the Governor's Commission: "[I]t 
must be stressed that we regard it as 
absolutely essential that the decisional 
process be kept the province of the 
court, not the counselor." Gov. 
Comm. Report, pp. 20-2l. 
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Nevertheless, the Act remains a good step. Appellate 
gloss and legislative reworking will doubtless dampen even 
more the stimuli for bitterness and acrimonious exchange 
with which the prior law was so fraught, and which the new 
Act strives-in large measure successfully-to remove. The 
Family Law Act is a massive venture; in terms of its com-
plexity and of the number of people it affects, it is perhaps 
the largest legislative reform effort successfully undertaken 
in the history of this State. It is a safe prediction that progress 
will continue to be made. 
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APPENDIX A 
CROSS-REFERENCE TABLES 
Prepared by R. Blair Reynolds, A.B. University of Califor-
nia (Berkeley), J.D. 1966, Hastings; formerly Counsel to the 
Senate Committee on Judiciary and presently Vice-President 
and General Counsel, California Law Title Association. They 
are reprinted here with the permission of that body. 
FAMILY LAW ACT (Chapters 1608 and 1609, 
Statutes of 1969) 
TABLE I. Correlation of Former to New SectioDS 
NOTE: In the following table, sections marked with an asterisk {*} 
have been carried over in the new law without substantive change. 
Where the letter "N" appears, the section was repealed without 
adding any comparable provision in the new law. 
Former New Former New 
Section Section Section Section 
Civ.C Civ.C Civ.C Civ.C 
55* ....... . 4100 79* ........ 4213 
56 ......... 4101 79.1* ., ..... 4214 
56.1 * ....... 4102 79a'" ....... 4215 
57* ........ 4103 79.01 * ...... 4300 
59'" ........ 4400 79.02* '" '" 4301 
61 ......... 4401 79.03'" ...... 4302 
62 ......... N 79.03a'" ., ... 4303 
63'" ........ 4104 79.04'" ..... , 4304 
68'" ........ 4200 79.05'" '" " . 4305 
69 ......... 4201 79.06'" ...... 4306 
69 a'" ....... 4202 79.07'" ...... 4307 
69b'" ....... 4203 79.08'" ...... 4308 
69.5'" ....... 4204 79.09'" ...... 4309 
70* ....... . 4205 80 ......... 4450 
71* ....... . 4206 82 ......... 4425 
72'" ....... . 4207 83'" ........ 4426 
73'" ....... . 4208 84 ......... 4453;4454 
74'" ....... . 4209 85'" ........ 4453 
76* ....... . 4210 86'" ........ 4451 
77* ....... . 4211 87* ........ 4456 
78'" ....... . 4212 88* ........ 4457 
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Former New Former New 
Section Section Section Section 
Civ.C Civ.C Civ.C Civ.C 
90* ....... . 4500 137.2 ....... 4516;4540 
91'" ....... . 4501 137.3 ....... 4456;4525 
92 ........ . 4506 137.5'" ...... 4526 
93 ........ . N 137.6* ...... 4517; 4540 
94 ........ . N 138 ......... 4600 
95 ........ . N 139 ......... 4540; 4700(a); 4801(a), 
96 ......... N (b) & (c); 4811 
97 ......... N 139.1 * 4700(c); 4812 
98 ......... N 139.5 . .... 4702(b) & (c) 
99 ......... N 139.7* 4801(e) 
100 ......... N 139.8* 4700(b); 4801(d) 
101 ......... N 140* . ....... 4700(a); 4800; 4801(a); 
102 ......... N 4540 
103 ......... N 140.5* . ..... 4803 
104 ......... N 140.7'" . ..... 4804 
105 ......... N 141'" . ....... 4805 
106 ......... N 142 . ........ 4806 
107 ......... N 143* . ....... 4807 
108 ......... 4510 144 . ........ N 
111 ......... N 145 . ........ N 
112 ......... N 146 . ........ 4800;4808 
113 ......... N 147'" . ....... 4809 
114 ......... N 148* . ....... 4810 
115 ......... N 149 . ........ 149 
116 ......... N 150* . ....... 5000 
117 ......... N 150.1 * 5001 
118 ......... N 150.2'" 5002 
119 ......... N 150.3* 5003 
120 ......... N 150.4* 5004 
121 ........ . N 155* ........ 5100 
122 ........ . N 156* ........ 5101 
123 ........ . N 157 ......... 4518(3); 5102 
124 ........ . N 158* ........ 5103 
125 ........ . N 159* ........ 4802 
126 ........ . N 160* ........ 4802 
127 ........ . N 161* ........ 5104 
128 ........ . 4530 (a) 161a* ....... 5105 
128.1 ...... . 4530 (b) 161b* ....... 5106 
129* ....... . 4531 162* ........ 5107 
130 ........ . 4511 163 ......... 5108 
131 * ....... . 4512;4521 163.5'" ...... 5109 
131.5* ..... . 4513 164* ........ 5110 
132 ......... 4514 164.5* 5111 
133 ........ . 4515 164.6* ...... 5112 
136 ........ . 4502 164.7'" ...... 5113 
137 ........ . 4503 165* ........ 5114 
137.1 * ..... . 4703 166* ........ 5115 
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Former New Former New 
Section Section Section Section 
Civ.C Civ.C Civ.C Civ.C 
167* ........ 5116 172b* . ...... 5128 
168* ........ 5117 173* . ....... 5129 
169* ........ 5118 174* . ....... 5130 
169.1 * ..... . 5119(a) 175 ......... 5131 
169.2* ..... . 5119(b) 176 ......... 5132 
169.3 ....... 5126 177* . ....... 5133 
170* ........ 5120 178* . ....... 5134 
171* ........ 5121 179* . ....... 5135 
171 a'" 5122 180* ........ 5136 
171b'" ...... . 5123 181'" ........ 5137 
171c* ....... 5124 182* . ....... 5138 
172'" ....... . 5125 199'" ........ 4603 
172a'" ....... 5127 
TABLE n. Derivation of New Sections 
New Former New Former 
Section Section Section Section 
Civ.C Civ.C Civ.C Civ.C 
4000 ....... . (new) 4306 ........ 79.06 
4001 ....... . (new) 4307 ........ 79.07 
4100 ....... . 55 4308 ........ 79.08 
4101 ....... . 56 4309 ........ 79.09 
4102 ....... . 56.1 4400 ........ 59 
4103 ....... . 57 4401 ........ 61 
4104 ....... . 63 4425 ........ 82 
4200 ....... . 68 4426 ........ 83 
4201 ....... . 69 4429 ........ (new) 
4202 ....... . 69a 4450 ........ 80 
4203 ....... . 69b 4451 ........ 86 
4204 ....... . 69.5 4452 ........ (new) 
4205 ....... . 70 4453 ........ 84; 85 
4206 ....... . 71 4454 ........ 84 
4207 ....... . 72 4455 ........ (new) 
4208 ....... . 73 4456 ........ 87; l37.3 
4209 ....... . 74 4457 ........ 88 
4210 ....... . 76 4500 ........ 90 
4211 ....... . 77 4501 ........ 91 
4212 ....... . 78 4502 ........ 136 
4213 ....... . 79 4503 ........ 137 
4214 ....... . 79.1 4504 ........ (new) 
4215 ....... . 79a 4505 ........ (new) 
4300 ....... . 79.01 4506 ........ 92 
4301 ....... . 79.02 4507 ........ (new) 
4302 ....... . 79.03 4508 ........ (new) 
4303 ........ 79.03a CCP 
4304 ....... . 79.04 4509 ........ 426b 
4305 ........ 79.05 Civ.C 
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New Former New Former 
Section Section Section Section 
Civ.C Civ.C Civ.C Civ.C 
4510 ....... . 108 5003 ........ 150.3 
4511 · . . . . . . . 130 5004 · . . . . . . . 150.4 
4512 ........ 131 5100 . ....... 155 
4513 ....... . 131.5 5101 ........ 156 
4514 ........ 132 5102 . ....... 157 
4515 · . . . . . . . 133 5103 ........ 158 
4516 · . . . . . . . 137.2 5104 ........ 161 
4517 ....... . 137.6 5105 ........ 161a 
4518 ....... . 157 5106 ........ 161b 
CCP 5107 ........ 162 
4519 · . . . . . . . 125 5108 ........ 163 
4520 ....... . (new) 5109 ........ 163.5 
Civ.C 5110 · . . . . . . . 164 
4521 ....... . 131 5111 ........ 164.5 
4525 ... , .... 137.3 5112 ........ 164.6 
4526 ....... . 137.5 5113 · . . . . . . . 164.7 
4530 · . . . . . . . 128; 128.1 5113.5 ....... (new) 
4531 ....... . 129 5114 ........ 165 
4540 · . . . . . . . 137.2; 137.6; 139 5115 ........ 166 
4600 · . . . . . . . 138 5116 ........ 167 
4601 ....... . (new) 5117 ........ 168 
4602 ....... . (new) 5118 ........ 169 
4603 · . . . . . . . 199 5119 ........ 169.1; 169.2 
4700 ....... . 139; 139.1; 139.8; 140 5120 ........ 170 
4701 ....... . (new) 5121 ........ 171 
4702 ....... . 139.5 5122 ........ 171a 
4703 ....... . 137.1 5123 ........ 171b 
4800 · . . . . . . . 146 5124 ........ 171c 
4801 ....... . 139; 139.7; 139.8; 140 5125 ........ 172 
4802 ....... . 159; 160 5126 ........ 169.3 
4803 ....... . 140.5 5127 ........ 172a 
4804 ....... . 140.7 5128 ........ 172b 
4805 ....... . 141 5129 ........ 173 
4806 ....... . 142 5130 ........ 174 
4807 ....... . 143 5131 ........ 175 
4808 ....... . 146 5132 ........ 176 
4809 · . . . . . . . 147 5133 · . . . . . . . 177 
4810 ....... . 148 5134 ........ 178 
4811 · . . . . . . . 139 5135 ........ 179 
4812 ....... . 139.1 5136 ........ 180 
5000 ....... . 150 5137 ........ 181 
5001 ....... . 150.1 5138 ........ 182 
5002 · . . . . . . . 150.2 
* 
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